Dealing With Today’s
Asymmetric Threat
to U.S. and Global Security

Soft Power
This document is intended only as a summary of the personal remarks made by participants at the October 2008 symposium, “Dealing With Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security, Symposium Two: Soft Power,” co-sponsored by CACI International Inc (CACI) and the United States Naval Institute (USNI). It is published as a public service. It does not necessarily reflect the views of CACI, USNI, the U.S. government, or their officers and employees.
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Executive Summary

The world today is threatened by a host of state and non-state actors who asymmetrically challenge the national security and “national will” of countries around the world, particularly those aligned with the West.

CACI International Inc is co-sponsoring a three-part symposium series to discuss these asymmetric threats to U.S. and global security and contribute to the development of a new national security strategy.

Symposium One, co-sponsored with the National Defense University, defined and characterized the asymmetrical threat problem. Symposium Two, co-sponsored with the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) focused on the role of soft power in U.S. national security and the capabilities of U.S. institutions to utilize soft power instruments in meeting American national security goals. Symposium Three, also co-sponsored with USNI, will address how soft power can be combined with traditional military “hard” power.

This paper presents the results and recommendations of Symposium Two.

Government leaders in the United States have, for some time, reached a general consensus that there are limits on the efficacy of military force alone in meeting current and future asymmetrical threats. The collective and coordinated strengths of a broad range of government institutions, the private sector, and the influence of American culture are needed to effectively meet increasingly asymmetrical challenges and threats.

The current foreign policy dialogue is focusing on what is commonly referred to as “soft power.” The concept has an important role to play in an integrated national security strategy.

While Congress has initiated steps to strengthen the soft power capabilities of federal government departments and agencies, more is needed if the United States is to move forward in creating a meaningful and practical security framework in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University created the term “soft power,” which he described as “the ability to shape the preferences of others” and “getting others to want the outcomes you want.” Although the phrase was coined in 1990, the concept behind soft power has been evolving for some time. During the Cold War era, the United States actively used a rich portfolio of soft power tools and established organizations to promote democratic values and ideals. Examples included cultural tours of foreign capitals, Voice of America, and the Peace Corps.

When the Cold War ended, the need for these tools seemed to diminish and many of these soft power initiatives were reduced or eliminated. In the 1990s, a new “war of ideas” emerged, along with a new set of security threats. These threats came from sources with varying capabilities and agendas that could not be easily deterred solely through hard power (military) means. In the meantime, the U.S. had not done enough to communicate and extend the ideals that promote peaceful and stable societies. American influence was in decline worldwide, and international opinion (exacerbated by internally directed media criticism) of the U.S. steadily decreased, even in allied nations. It is now clear that the United States must invest significant intellectual and financial capital in programs to reverse these trends.

The United States must develop a truly integrated national security strategy that synchronizes both hard and soft power appropriate for each situation, and that adjusts as the particular threat evolves.

The U.S. has found itself at a “strategic inflection point” where it must reassess its institutions, processes, and resources to defeat violent, extremist threats and to promote freedom, development, and social justice around the world.

Existing soft power initiatives and agencies, particularly those engaged in development and strategic communications, must be reinvigorated through increased funding, human resources, and prioritization. Concurrently, the U.S. government must establish goals, objectives, and metrics for soft power initiatives.
The U.S. government, recognizing this need, has taken steps to address these issues. However, to be most effective, the government’s renovation of soft power must be part of a broader-scoped national security model. One way to achieve this can be by enacting legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1986). This would coordinate, integrate, and synchronize soft power responsibilities and resources among government agencies; centralize operational authority; and streamline the operational chain of command in providing national direction on diplomacy, development, and defense. Another approach would be to consider an even broader-scoped reorganization through a review and realignment, or restructuring, of the U.S. government’s national security infrastructure as currently embodied in the National Security Act of 1947.

A large-scale reorganization will require, as envisioned here, significant financial and human resources. Even the Defense Department, which in 2008 received $16 in military programs for every $1 invested in diplomacy, has acknowledged a need for dramatic spending and staffing increases in diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. Suggestions on how to provide these additional resources include setting a top-line figure for national security spending focusing on overall requirements rather than Defense Department benchmarks. At the same time, a soft power budget could be coordinated through the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council that would adhere to budget guidelines and the President’s national security priorities.

The next generation of public diplomacy will be engaging in the most important ideological challenge of modern times. To proactively promote abroad the values of democracy, and to revitalize America’s international image and prestige, the U.S. government must engage in a variety of soft power initiatives. These initiatives must focus on improving individual welfare and civil society, enhancing the rule of law and order, and developing economic opportunities around the world. These efforts must also be carried out in cooperation with academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international institutions (governmental and non-governmental), and the private sector.

There are several key areas in which the United States can effectively improve its soft power initiatives.

By providing improved medical care, international health diplomacy can improve international opinion of the U.S., regain trust and moral authority, and even deny terrorists and extremists safe harbor, while engendering some of the best American values.

A reinvigorated and proactive strategic communications program is needed to better disseminate the democratic and cultural values of liberty and individual freedoms. Organizations with these responsibilities need to be modernized and empowered, and must take advantage of leading technologies to be successful. U.S. embassies should move away from being semi-fortified bureaucratic facilities to become cultural outreach centers, engaging the people of their host nations. The United States needs improved educational initiatives to counter intolerant ideologies (religious and cultural) that are often used to justify violence. It must also find ways to promote the success of these overseas activities by building strong, broad-based support at home. Furthermore, Americans need to be better informed about their government’s ongoing positive efforts to support the spread of democracy. Improved education in American civics at all academic (and especially grade school) levels is seen as necessary in achieving such outcomes.
By helping other nations establish a robust and dynamic legal framework, initiatives aimed at promoting the rule of law can promote better governance, foster economic development, and enable dispute resolution, thereby preserving stability. A current example is the Defense Department’s new focus on giving stability operations the same priority as combat operations. The law can also be used to structure the reallocation of hard and soft power assets as necessary to defeat an ever-changing and evolving threat. Again, a Goldwater-Nichols-like act would be a prime example.

U.S. businesses have made an indelible mark around the world, from the global and around-the-clock presence of the American media to the worldwide demand for American brands. Their role in American soft power has been extensive, and the federal government should continue to promote an integrated and strong U.S. international commercial presence. A greater weight should be placed on exporting American goods and services, while liberalizing trade regimes and creating transparent and level playing fields for healthy global competition. This includes relaxing hard-power-related export restrictions. Many American companies also engage in social welfare programs in the countries in which they operate, and they can be made more effective as part of a civic-centered legal framework and national security strategy. Therefore, increased support of and partnerships with the private sector should be an important part of a new national soft power strategy.

Furthermore, the U.S. government can better maximize the effectiveness of soft power instruments and efforts through increased partnerships with NGOs. By providing humanitarian and development assistance in areas typically inaccessible to government agencies, NGOs are often able to access potential extremist areas before the government can establish or strengthen diplomatic, developmental, or military presence, including intelligence. These relationships should include supporting private foundations that support American democracy and cultural values with programs to improve social and economic welfare in developing countries.

Finally, the United States must work with foreign governments and international institutions to strengthen existing partnerships or build new ones that enhance U.S. capabilities to combat and contain the forces of global extremism, terrorist violence, and other similar hostile asymmetric threats. This includes leveraging American commercial institutions, such as the U.S. Export/Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to promote strong international commercial partnership, while fostering a sound fiscal regime at the international level.

This mix is now commonly referred to as “smart power.” Symposium Three will address how smart power should be structured and applied for offensive and defensive purposes in a highly net-centric world.

President Barack Obama’s election has gathered the world’s attention, and presents a unique opportunity for the United States to reassert its leadership in confronting the rapidly evolving and multi-dimensional asymmetric threats to global peace and security. The effectiveness of the U.S. national security strategy for the future depends on the nation’s capacity to anticipate and assess these threats, and to integrate both soft and hard power — smart power — swiftly and adaptively to create a highly successful response.
The Asymmetric Threat Symposium Series

Following the end of World War II, through the Cold War, the U.S. government adopted a consistent series of national security strategies across successive U.S. administrations to counter the relatively uniform and conventional communist threats. Likewise, during the nearly 12 years between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, U.S. national strategies remained relatively unchanged as the world adjusted to having a single superpower, while witnessing a number of regional conflicts (with the notable exception of the First Gulf War in 1990-1992).

With the horrendous attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the post-Cold War era was permanently transformed as new, lethal, and asymmetrical threats emerged to dominate the world stage. Since 9/11, the United States has been engaged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the concepts of asymmetric warfare have become a dangerous reality. Even a positive outcome in these conflicts will not erase these evolving threats. The terrorist threat, grown on a foundation of political instability and religious extremism, has capably and creatively leveraged technology, strategic communications, and divergent Western policies and priorities, laws, and treaties to enhance both its credibility and efficacy. The source of these threats is also diverse. In addition to well-known terror groups like Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah, asymmetric threats also arise from burgeoning movements in geopolitically sensitive areas like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Asymmetric threats are also amplified by nation-state turmoil and governments with radically different objectives, such as Iran, Sudan, North Korea, and Venezuela. A new national security strategy must focus not only on the threat but its root causes.

Given the markedly changed threat environment and the risks posed to U.S. national security and national interests, the United States must rethink the policies, structures, laws, and regulations, as well as the processes that have guided its national security strategy for the past 60 years. The U.S. needs to address those changes that must be made in national security policy formulation and the national security strategy itself.

In late 2007, CACI International Inc (CACI) and its colleagues decided that a symposium series should be held to:

- Examine the expanding asymmetric threat challenges;
- Encourage a national dialogue on the requirements that need to be addressed by a national strategic security strategy; and
- Develop an understanding and framework for what is now labeled as “smart power.”

CACI and the National Defense University co-sponsored the first symposium, and CACI and the U.S. Naval Institute co-sponsored the second and are co-sponsoring the third.

The intent of CACI and its partners has been to enlist leaders from government, industry, and academia to contribute to shaping a vision for the future that will guide national security professionals in their efforts to protect the United States in this age of asymmetric threats. Furthermore, each symposium and its proceedings will be published and made readily available to the public, free of charge.
The symposia have been organized as follows:

- **Symposium One:** Recognized and defined the asymmetrical threat problem, showing its breadth and depth as both persistent and enduring, and that the United States’ approach to the problem, as presently constituted, will need to change if success is to be achieved. (May 8, 2008 at Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.)

- **Symposium Two:** Explored critical elements of soft power and how it should be used. Examined how the U.S. government may best adapt its structure and policies to effectively incorporate soft power into national strategies. (October 21, 2008 at Ft. Myer, Va.)

- **Symposium Three:** Concludes the series by describing how smart power should be structured and applied for offensive and defensive purposes in a highly net-centric world. (March 24, 2009 at Ft. Myer, Va.)

At its conclusion, the intent of the symposia is to have 1) stimulated and contributed to the national security dialogue; and 2) developed a meaningful and practical framework for developing a more integrated national security strategy in response to the global asymmetric threats facing the world today.

1 Appendix A presents a summary of Symposium One’s proceedings. The full report of the proceedings can be found at http://www.caci.com/announcement/CACI_Asymmetric_Threat_paper.pdf.


Taking this broadening understanding of the threat and its implications to the United States and its allies, it is imperative that there be a common set of terms, concepts, strategies, operational methods, and tactics to combat and defeat these threats.

On October 21, 2008, recognizing this need to explore formally the meaning, role, and importance of soft power, CACI and the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) co-hosted the second in a series of three symposia focusing on soft power (Symposium Two). A primary objective of Symposium Two was to stimulate a dialogue on soft power, focusing on diplomatic, economic, rule of law, commerce, cultural, and educational tools and resources.

“The Government and non-government institutions, including the private sector, must strengthen existing partnerships to develop a comprehensive and unified grand national security strategy to proactively address the increasingly ominous asymmetric threat to U.S. and global security.”


The remainder of this report synopsizes the presentations, questions, answers, and discussions that took place during Symposium Two:

- This report begins with a brief discussion of soft power and the recent history of the United States’ application of soft power. Included are the comments and conclusions of Symposium Two participants (speakers, panelists, attendees) to identify the critical tools of soft power, and show evidence of past and recent successes. Also presented is evidence of the lack of effective utilization of soft power tools.

- Next, this report will summarize Symposium Two discussions and conclusions of issues relating to rebuilding the United States’ soft power capabilities. Reported are some of the most critical challenges Symposium Two participants identified in rebuilding the United States’ soft power capabilities. Symposium Two also discussed in considerable depth some of the methods and business processes developed by the Department of Defense (DoD) that may be laterally exploited in rebuilding the United States’ soft power capabilities so that they are as effective as hard power.

- Finally, the report will review several of the participants’ discussions on the challenging issues of balancing soft and hard power as part of the creation of a smart power strategy.

This report also sets the stage for the third symposium to be held on March 24, 2009. That symposium will explore the means necessary to integrate hard and soft power effectively into a coordinated national security paradigm – smart power – to meet the security realities of the twenty-first century.
At its most basic level, asymmetric warfare refers to conflict between two or more actors – nations, coalitions, or non-state groups – whose relative military power differs significantly. Contemporary military thinkers broaden this definition to include asymmetry of strategy or tactics. Therefore, the terms “asymmetric warfare” and “asymmetric threat” describe conflicts or threats where the capabilities of two adversaries differ markedly at their core. Asymmetry can also be found in application of those capabilities that influence peoples and populations in a very positive way other than through the force of arms.

Roger Barnett of the Naval War College, and author of the seminal book Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenges to U.S. Military Power, gives added significance to this thinking. He recently pointed out that to win the hearts and minds of the populace, “we must make the ordinary folks feel secure. If they feel secure, they will not resist. It is that simple, and has always been that simple, but we had to learn it the hard way.”

3.2 American Soft Power in the Cold War Era

At the end of World War II and in the years immediately following, the United States developed a national security structure and apparatus based on the existing environment, encompassing international power politics, economics, and technology, especially information and communications technology. The National Security
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Symposium Two: Soft Power

Act, which set the current national security structure for the United States, was signed into law in 1947. The post-war era also saw the rise of multi-national security alliances, most strongly embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the growing role of global institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, and the sweeping public diplomacy of that era.

During the Cold War era, the United States fielded a rich portfolio of institutions and methods to share democratic ideas and engage people around the world. America employed a variety of public diplomatic activities, such as the Congress of Cultural Freedom, the Marshall Plan, and the United States Information Agency (USIA). It also launched the Peace Corps, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe, and put libraries in foreign cities. The United States sent museum exhibitions and performers abroad, furthering the understanding and appeal of American culture – often despite host country governments’ preferences. Such successful initiatives were instruments of what contemporary literature now calls soft power.

While the “long twilight struggle” concluded with the United States and its allies winning the Cold War, the world evolved beyond the more effective elements of the U.S.’s national security apparatus. Critically, technological resources and economic conditions flattened as people’s means of communications and information management, including computers, the Internet, cable and satellite broadcasting, and more, created a 24/7 network with instant access and global reach. Remarkably, these changes outpaced politics, even becoming a driver in the political process. And a “revolution of rising expectations” was in significant measure fulfilled in the growth of a middle class around the world.

Yet after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, there was an overwhelming bipartisan feeling that the “war of ideas” was over. In the 1990s, the U.S. government unilaterally began to disarm and drastically down-size its soft power instruments. Budgets were cut; international radio and television broadcasting was marginalized. USIA was disbanded, its budget and personnel transferred to the State Department.

The United States’ soft power disarmament offered others an opportunity to move into the “battlespace of ideas.” It was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the resulting perception of a clear and present danger to the United States that brought to the forefront a new war of ideas, fundamental to the asymmetric conflict that exists today. Through those events, Americans once again learned that not only were there forces that do not obey the rule of law, but also there were limits to the use and effectiveness of military might to deter those forces. Indeed, there were examples where the Western concept of the rule of law was seen as an asymmetric advantage by adversary and enemy alike.

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7 Coincidentally, the transistor was also invented in 1947 at Bell Labs. The transistor was a key technology that enabled the development of the modern information processing and communications technologies that contributed significantly to the creation of some of the factors that led to the current decline in the United States’ instruments of soft power.

8 Ambassador Brian Carlson, USNI-CACI symposium comments.

9 John F. Kennedy Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961. The complete quote in all its poignancy is: “Now the trumpet summons us again – not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are – but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, ‘rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation’ – a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.” Italics added. http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres56.html.

10 A “revolution of rising expectations” is a term that evolved in the 1950s and 60s to describe the future of economic progress and relative political growth and stability in the developing world.

11 Carlson, op. cit.

12 Ibid.
In the wake of 9/11, the United States reacted to the new high-probability, high-impact threat environment through a “coalition of the willing” that pursued a hard power approach to the global jihadist/terrorist threat, not incorporating soft power initiatives. The remaining soft power infrastructure of the U.S. government had further atrophied.

The United States finds itself at a “strategic inflection point” where there is a growing realization that institutions, processes, and procedures that were instrumental in its Cold War victory are not serving the nation’s needs today, and will not get the country where it needs to be tomorrow.13

The limits of hard power have since become increasingly evident as the asymmetrical nature of current conflicts has come into increasingly sharp focus. There now seems to be broad consensus in Washington that soft power will be essential to defeat violent extremist threats and promote freedom and social justice around the world. In addition, the U.S. government recognizes that the incentives to achieve these goals have changed, and that Americans must work together with their allies to conduct diplomatic and development activities as a critical and effective counterpart to military action. With the United States continuing to maintain a lead role in global politics, it is critical for it to reinvigorate selected soft power instruments from the Cold War abandoned in the early ’90s, while also implementing new soft power instruments capable of meeting current and future threats.

3.2.1 Waning of the United States’ Soft Power

Considerable evidence exists showing that the United States’ soft power has been in decline. While many nations see the advantages of an interconnected world, free-flowing information, and stable, prosperous societies, others remain under the control of more radical authoritarian regimes – Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, China, North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Burma, and others – where information is manipulated (propaganda) to breed hostility and discontent against democratic ideas and values.

The United States is not seen doing enough to communicate and extend the ideals that promote peaceful and stable societies. U.S. government programs and financing seem particularly misaligned. While two days of operational expenditures in Iraq could fund a complete secular education system to counter jihadist schools, the United States has neither developed nor funded comprehensive educational programs as a component within the overall strategy in Iraq to foster economic opportunity for disaffected youth as an alternative to radicalization. Furthermore, the gap between employment opportunities and workforce growth in the Middle East, as compared to the West, increases the future risk of disaffected and discontented populations.

These are problems that soft power can address directly through the creation of economic opportunity, and by doing so can mitigate these risks and turn the next generation into allies rather than adversaries, while reestablishing the image of the United States around the world.

13 Major General Thomas Wilkerson, USNI-CACI symposium comments. “Strategic Inflection Point” is a term coined by Intel’s Andy Grove to describe the period of change that affects an organization’s competitive position and its ability to recognize and adapt to change factors of major significance.
3.2.1.1 Observations of Public Opinion

According to a recent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, 50 of the 192 independent nation-states in the world are either failed or failing, creating a critical threat. Rogue states, criminal organizations, and terrorists use America’s own freedoms to attack it. They use the nation’s openness, advanced technologies, and freedom of movement against it.

Adding to this problem is a critical lack of accurate information about the United States throughout the world. While people in the West naively tend to think that a post-Cold War world provides free access and freely flowing information, much of the world’s population lives under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. The resulting lack of transparency in the information available to populations fosters increased anti-American sentiment. For example, in many regions where information flow is less than free, people believe that the United States is conducting a war against Islam, creating a serious misunderstanding and values gap between the United States and non-extremist Islam. In addition to the lack of accurate information, there is an abundance of misinformation, often unverified and repeated by the international media, that creates an anti-American propaganda effect – intentional or unintentional. This problem is serious and pervasive.

And around the world, anti-American sentiment is growing. In a December 2008 report, the Pew Research Center found that positive views of the United States declined in 26 of the 33 countries surveyed. As one might expect, the United States’ image is very low in Muslim countries in the Middle East and Asia, and it has even declined among the publics in many of the country’s oldest allies, including many in Europe.

At the same time, American influence in the rest of the world remains strong. Much of the global economy is tied to American economic growth or recession. American films fill 80 percent of the movie screens in Europe. In bookstores from Riga to Rangoon, American authors are translated into local languages and routinely out-sell native authors.

The dominance of American institutions and the complexity of many of the problems facing the world today – extreme poverty, failed governance, major demographic relocations, illegal immigration, religious extremism, and more – leads the world to look to the United States for solutions. Whether deserved or not, failure by the United States to make a substantive improvement or even to address these issues will diminish the United States’ influence, including its commensurate ability to apply soft power.

3.2.1.2 Assessment of the Condition of Soft Power Institutions

During the Cold War, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was one of the most powerful instruments of soft power the U.S. government had at its disposal. In many places, USAID was and is the most visible face of the United States.
Today, in many areas, U.S. influence through daily interactions with civil-society leaders, government officials, members of local legislative bodies, and business people is far greater than the State Department’s or the Pentagon’s, whose representatives tend to remain in capital cities. Importantly, its interaction with the “people” is without parallel among U.S. agencies. However, USAID’s effectiveness has been markedly reduced because of underfunding and understaffing. For much of its existence, USAID had substantial resources and autonomy, but in recent decades these have largely been stripped away. To reestablish the effectiveness of USAID, this agency must be reinvigorated and its staff and financial resources significantly enhanced, perhaps by orders of magnitude.

Another example of a soft power domain in decline is in strategic communications. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and its overseas arm, the U.S. Information Service (USIS), once included Voice of America, which broadcast America’s message in 53 languages to an international audience; Radio Martí, providing broadcasts and telecasts in Spanish to Cuba; WORLDNET, USIA’s satellite television network; and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, broadcasting in 23 languages to Central Europe, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and the former Soviet republics. In 1999, USIS and USIA were eliminated, and their responsibilities folded into the State Department. Over the next few years, the combined cost of the State Department’s public diplomacy programs and the U.S.’s international broadcasting came to a little over a billion dollars, about 4 percent of the nation’s total international affairs budget, about 3 percent of the intelligence budget, and 0.29 percent of the military budget.

Meanwhile, just as the United States was dismantling its Cold War-era strategic communications vehicles, and building limited replacement capabilities suited to the Internet age, the nation’s opponents were vigorously developing their strategic communications by leveraging American-innovated technologies and media vehicles, from e-mail to Web 2.0 social networking sites. The Internet became, and remains, the jihadists’ information highway.

Further diluting the U.S. government’s soft power capabilities is the dispersion of the agencies and methods used to promote and communicate soft power. While DoD is the focal point for hard power—and has employed civil affairs and communications programs at tactical and operational levels—the means of projecting soft power are spread across numerous government departments and agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multi-national organizations. Moreover, in this information age, this includes any U.S.-based entity with an Internet presence, whether or not it is in the nation’s best interest. This state of affairs has existed since the early 1990s.

### 3.2.2 Efficacy and Application of the Instruments of Soft Power

A renaissance of U.S. soft power is necessary, and it could begin, logically, where current applications of soft power are already succeeding.

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21 Colonel Stephen Ganyard, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
22 USIA Fact Sheet, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/.
Indeed, the U.S. government has already begun to organize and implement diplomatic and development activities that have contributed significantly to that renaissance. Nevertheless, much more needs to be done to ensure that effective, sustainable improvements will be made under the next administration, and beyond. The focus should then be on current activities and the next steps that provide selected examples of the path to enhanced soft power.

The next sections capture the essence of those discussions, but it is important to note that these examples are limited to the soft power instruments discussed and do not represent or purport to represent an exhaustive inventory of smart power instruments and methodologies.

4 Enhancing U.S. Soft Power Capabilities and Implementation

The question that has emerged is: How should the United States integrate and apply the instruments of soft power into its national security model? Not only will existing government structures and processes need to be reviewed and revamped (perhaps reorganized entirely), but metrics for success will also have to be established.

4.1 Restructuring for a Soft Power Strategy

Identifying, integrating, reinforcing, and empowering those government departments and agencies who share the most effective elements of soft power will be difficult, but necessary. Equally difficult will be the challenge of marshalling these elements toward a set of common objectives. Even when those goals are set, to achieve success:

- Bureaucratic, legal, and policy barriers to soft power enhancement will need to be removed;
- Some level of government reorganization should place increased emphasis (with commensurate policy authority and budget control) on the importance and coordination of soft power capabilities; and
- The United States will need to find ways to resource a new soft power strategy in the midst of an extended economic crisis, severe budget deficits, and a national tendency to turn inward in times of economic stress.

Ultimately, more than a simple evolution from current approaches will be necessary to accomplish all that is needed to position the United States for success.

The National Security Act of 1947 provides the legal foundation for much of the current U.S. national security structure. Today, many believe there is a manifest need for a new or amended national security act that reflects the current threat environment, and that will incorporate all the elements of national power, including both hard and soft power. Making any such change, however, will require a coordinated effort between the executive and legislative branches. It will be very important that any new legislation remove barriers created by the act and other statutes. This includes relegating responsibilities for international activities to such federal organizations as DoD, the State Department, and the CIA; and placing responsibilities for domestic activities with the Justice Department and 86,000 different municipalities and jurisdictions in the United States. Such distinctions in responsibility are no longer meaningful as asymmetric challenges such as security threats and pandemic diseases, and even modern communications tools, do not recognize these boundaries.24

One approach to improving coordination of soft power responsibilities and resources among government agencies is enacting legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Goldwater-Nichols Act markedly improved how DoD operated by centralizing operational authority through

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24 Howard, op. cit.
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman was
designated as the principal military advisor to the
President, the National Security Council, and Secretary of
Defense. The act also streamlined the operational chain of
command from the President to the Secretary of Defense
to the unified commanders.25

A Goldwater-Nichols-type of act could, for example,
establish a civilian equivalent to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff that would include the most senior career officers
from federal agencies such as the State Department,
USAID, the Treasury Department, and the Commerce
Department. Chaired by a senior Foreign Service officer,
this statutory institution would provide national direction
on diplomacy, development, and crisis prevention.
This group would also provide to agency heads and to
the National Security Council a source of independent
judgment on development issues, just as the Joint Chiefs
do on military matters.26

However, the change of presidential administrations
will bring a new perspective to the restructuring issue.
President Obama’s administration will have its own
national security team, who will define the membership
of the National Security Council and determine who has a
seat at the table.27

“A senior Obama aide said the incoming
administration will create teams of diplomats and
other civilian officials who can be quickly deployed
overseas after natural disasters or political upheavals
to help fragile countries get back on their feet …
The aide declined to say whether new spending
on such teams would be offset by cuts in defense
spending.”


Yet even the orderly transition of executive
administrations works against the kinds of changes that
are urgently needed. New heads of departments require
time to transition or change current programs and
policies. The new administration will be expected to focus
on current critical areas, such as the fiscal crisis, ongoing
international conflicts, and an aggressive domestic
agenda. Changes in the national security power paradigm
to incorporate, integrate, and strengthen national soft
power capabilities will require the new administration to
pursue such changes very aggressively during its early
months. If not, some fear substantive change will be
unlikely to happen.28

4.2 Resourcing a Viable
Soft Power Strategy

The U.S. government will also have to address issues
related to resourcing a new soft power strategy in a period
of economic crisis and historic budgetary shortfalls.
Current military spending is benchmarked at about 4
percent of America’s gross domestic product (GDP).
Soft power departments, agencies, and institutions lack
similar benchmarks, which in itself is a statement of the
United States’ fiscal approach to soft power. In fact, “the
government spends $16 on military programs for every $1
invested in diplomacy.”29

25 National Defense University, “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
26 While there has been considerable debate about the organizational structure and effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it still provides
a conceptual example for interagency coordination.
28 Jonathan Winer, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
The Defense Department acknowledges a need for dramatic increases in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. However, DoD is not suggesting a major transfer of funds to other agencies. While acknowledging the need for soft power funding in his 2007 lecture at Kansas State University, Secretary Gates said that need would not stop him from requesting even more funding for defense in his next year’s budget submission.

The requested increase alone in the size of the FY 2010 Defense budget is 150 percent of the total State Department budget.

Today, the United States spends about half of its public diplomacy budget on international broadcasting, radio, and television. The United States International Affairs Budget, also known as the “150 Account,” funds America’s economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian initiatives abroad, encompassing programs that cover the breadth of the nation’s foreign and State Department activities critical to national security. For the first time, the 2002 national security strategy included development, along with diplomacy and defense, as a key third pillar vital to the country’s security (the “Three-D Approach”).

While the Three-D approach was reinforced in the 2006 national security strategy, some worry that in the future, urgent diplomatic and defense concerns will overwhelm long-term development needs and funding. There are different views of whether significant additional funding to Defense, State, USAID, or other soft power entities constitutes “throwing money” at soft power challenges. Yet Secretary Gates noted that such institutions required proper funding and staffing.

“To truly harness the ‘full strength of America’ … requires having civilian institutions of diplomacy and development that are adequately staffed and properly funded … It has become clear that America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long – relative to what we spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.”


Numerous options will need to be considered in resolving the fundamental resourcing imbalance between soft and hard power. A vigorous renaissance of soft power for the United States may lie along one or more of several paths:

- Developing a national security strategy that sets a top-line figure for national security spending focusing on overall requirements rather than DoD benchmarks. The distribution of funding would be among the arms contributing to American national security. Under a scenario where total spending was limited to 4 percent of GDP, the result would be roughly 3.8 percent of GDP for defense, not counting supplementals. Today, total spending on national security is about 4.2 percent, but a reduction to 3.8 percent for defense and 0.4 percent for everything else would not likely produce the kind of integrated political, economic, and military strategy that is needed.

- Coordinating the budget for soft power with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC). The OMB would provide budget guidelines (rather than

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31 Ganyard, op. cit.
32 Carlson, op. cit.
34 Dr. Kori Schake, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
directing resources) that conform to the President’s national security priorities. Combining that with the members of the NSC that have spending authority would promote better interagency functioning and more cohesive strategies.\(^\text{35}\)

With the projected drawdown of forces in Iraq, there will be an opportunity to reapportion some funding to reinvigorate the State Department, including USAID, and increase foreign aid and the number of authorized foreign service officers. Some non-DoD institutions may also benefit from cuts in large, platform-related programs in DoD that are already under scrutiny. Ultimately, the problem of resourcing soft power is an issue of leadership, partnership, and prioritization of resources.\(^\text{36}\)

### 4.3 The Goals and Metrics of Soft Power

Restoring America’s international image may be the most important soft power objective, and the advent of a new administration provides optimal timing for initiatives to achieve such an end. Developing a coordinated soft power strategy in today’s asymmetric threat environment is far more difficult than the Cold War strategy of providing positive alternatives to an unattractive opponent.

Historically, the U.S. government’s way of promoting its international image has been called public diplomacy, which targets the populations of other nations rather than their senior officials. Similar to commercial marketing, the United States promotes its national brand by understanding, informing, engaging, and influencing foreign populations. At the heart of the United States national brand is a belief that the best route to securing freedom is by helping people around the world to achieve their own.

If the United States is to attract and influence foreign publics through soft power, it must work through public and private venues and infrastructures that populations typically rely on—law enforcement, regulatory agencies, education, media, telecommunications, financial institutions, and more. Additionally, the United States needs to implement greatly enhanced news and public information dissemination programs.

When United States soft power helps these essential societal elements function on the side of good, justice, and predictability, and enforce norms, standard policies, and goals, such elements no longer serve as vehicles of discontent but actively enhance America’s image and prestige.\(^\text{37}\)

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**America is most influential when it serves as the role model for societal success.**

Success must also have some measure. Both quantitative and qualitative metrics need to be established when developing soft power strategies. Improvements in polls, such as those conducted by Pew measuring positive American images and reputation, are useful. Other criteria, such as political and social benchmarks, or improvements in economic indicators, must also be included to ascertain progress. Establishing such goals will legitimize and prioritize soft power’s role within American national security strategies.

\[^{35}\text{Schake, op. cit.}\]
\[^{36}\text{Rear Admiral David Stone, USNI-CACI symposium comments.}\]
\[^{37}\text{Winer, op. cit.}\]
4.4 The Next Generation of Diplomacy

4.4.1 Public Diplomacy

There is an increasing emphasis on the importance of changing selected aspects of the State Department’s approach to diplomacy. The American mission in this new age of public diplomacy and strategic communications requires a commitment to show the United States as a good and compassionate nation, while engaging in the most important ideological challenge of modern times. The United States must build educational and cultural institutions, as well as provide informational programs via the Internet.38 The nation must also adequately support those organizations and initiatives that promote positive international relations on a grass-roots level, e.g., the Peace Corps, USAID, HOPE, embassies, student exchange, trade exchange, and NGOs.39

4.4.1.1 International Public Health Initiatives

The U.S. government can reap significant soft power benefits by making the improvement of international public health a priority. Not only will this garner considerable soft power influence around the world by helping those that the government deals with abroad, but it will also support national objectives for improved health for all Americans since diseases do not respect international boundaries.40 Furthermore, health diplomacy engenders some of the best qualities that the United States has to offer and brings health professionals to communities that may be suspicious or even hostile to the United States.

Consequently, the U.S. government should place more emphasis on using its expertise in public healthcare to improve conditions of those populations susceptible to the destabilizing effects of Islamic extremism and other asymmetric forces. In addition to social welfare benefits, health diplomacy supports security efforts. For example, in Afghanistan, “[m]edical interventions are an important component of a diplomatic strategy to regain moral authority for U.S. actions, regain the trust of moderate Muslims, and deny terrorists and religious extremists unencumbered access to safe harbor in ungoverned spaces.”41

The United States can also continue to broaden its global influence through humanitarian assistance. For example, following the 2004 earthquake in Indonesia and the subsequent tsunami that affected much of southeast Asia, the crew of the U.S. Naval Ship (USNS) Mercy, a naval hospital ship comprised of representatives from the U.S. Navy and across the U.S. government and NGO community, used their diverse skill sets to provide healthcare and humanitarian assistance expeditiously and cost effectively.42 They provided a variety of medical, public health, and environmental services to the indigenous population. As a result, positive opinion of the United States among the population of Indonesia, the largest Muslim country by population, increased substantially.43 There is a critical challenge for the U.S. to devise methods for proactively deploying assets like the Mercy on a routine basis rather than solely in reaction to disasters.

38 Significant leverage is also possible through online efforts, in both information dissemination and collection.
39 Carlson, op. cit.
40 Colonel Randy Larsen, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
42 Rear Admiral David Rutstein, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
43 Ibid.
There are also many grass-roots efforts on this front. One example can be seen throughout the Kenyan villages along Lake Victoria, where more than half of the population has AIDS. Virtually every village has a small medical clinic funded not by USAID or the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), but by the donations of individual American families.44

The United States must also better recognize the preemptive value of providing humanitarian assistance. A new national security strategy needs to embrace “the reality that not only does a major war have the potential to threaten security and prosperity, but so do irregular or persistent regional conflicts, spasms of terrorism, recurrent natural disaster, and lawlessness.”445

4.4.2 Strategic Communications

The American message of freedom and democracy, tolerance and self-determination, and the rule of law, is unassailable, yet it needs an aggressive and proactive strategic communications program implemented and promoted by the U.S. government.

The United States’ strategic communications capability must be rebuilt by empowering, reestablishing, or replacing the organizations that have in the past been chartered to communicate America’s message to the world. This renaissance needs to take full advantage of the latest Internet technologies, ranging from streaming media to online gaming and social networking software. The strategic communications program must be reenergized so that America’s foreign broadcasting unapologetically carries a message that embodies democratic and freedom-based cultural values.

As a complement to these efforts, the U.S. government must simultaneously reinvigorate its strategic communications with the American people. The United States must find ways to promote the success of its overseas activities (existing and planned) by building strong, broad-based support at home. Americans need to be better informed about their government’s many and extensive ongoing successes and efforts to support the spread of democracy and provide resources that help millions of people around the world.

Attacks on the U.S. government from domestic media and politicians have created an unwarranted misunderstanding and discontent among the American people. For example, America’s educational system and medical advances have been generally well regarded worldwide. American initiatives have saved millions of lives with immunizations, AIDS programs, maritime safety activities, law enforcement support, and more.47 These sentiments and successes must be widely shared, publicized, and reinforced with the American people.

44 Secretary John Lehman, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
46 Stone, op. cit.
47 Admiral James M. Loy, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
4.4.2.1 Public Architecture as Communication

Public architecture, or the use of architectural resources in the public’s interest, is a renewed perspective within soft power. In the 1950s, the State Department supported noted architects as part of a post-war building program. The U.S. embassy in London, for example, was specifically designed to be a high-profile structure with large exhibition and assembly spaces. But the rise of anti-Americanism in the 1960s made security the primary design objective. New laws aimed at embassy security require these buildings to be more architecturally secure and set off from the local community. As a consequence, there are significant constraints placed on the opportunities and modes of interaction between foreign nationals and America’s official representatives.

Yet, embassies remain “the most visible symbol of America’s official presence abroad.” While maintaining security, this “bunker” mentality should be discarded and diplomats encouraged to reach outside embassy walls and share ideas within their host nations. The United States must move away from the hard power of the state-centric “Westphalian Agreement” model that dates to 1648, and rather move toward the cooperative and interactive diplomacy exemplified by initiatives like the Peace Corps, and more recent constructs like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that have been used successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These teams operate in particular localities in Iraq and Afghanistan and are in regular, direct contact with indigenous peoples. In the PRT model, a mixed team of military, State Department, USAID, and other specialists from the U.S. government – e.g., traffic engineers, or civil engineers who know how to make electrical systems work, or people who are working in a specific area on regional problems relating American assistance and engagement – come together in local areas to help influence a neighborhood or county more directly than they could from within a traditional embassy building. PRTs enable the United States to establish a presence and capacity to assist local peoples in areas outside of military bases and embassies. They allow the United States to expand its footprint in the war of ideas to demonstrate how American efforts and partnership can improve stability and security in otherwise unstable areas. Foreign partners also participate with Americans on PRTs.

Leaders of the Badakshan Province government, the private sector, NGOs, USAID, and other donors meet in Faizabad, Afghanistan to plan remedies for problems with roads, security, border access, training, mines, drugs, and agriculture. Photo courtesy of USAID.

49 Ibid.
50 Carlson, op. cit.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
The new embassy model, therefore, as exemplified by a PRT or another kind of outreach center, may be one of the tools that the United States needs to more effectively apply soft power.\textsuperscript{54} As part of an overall strategy, this new style of diplomacy may play an integral role in repositioning the United States for success with soft power in the future.

### 4.4.2.2 Communication Through Education

The United States is in the process of adapting the Cold War paradigms to the asymmetric battlefield of the war of ideas. With the case of radical Islam, the United States must confront an ideology that promotes intolerance, and justifies and enables violent extremism.

On this front, the United States has obtained significant returns when working with credible Islamic third parties.\textsuperscript{55} For example, the State Department is bringing imams from Islamic communities around the world to the United States to witness American culture and attitudes firsthand. In the past year alone, the government brought in more than 600 imams. After seeing that Islam is not only a respected but freely practiced religion in America, they have returned home to deliver vastly different messages in their Friday sermons.\textsuperscript{56} In a complementary action, the U.S. government is working to start up madrasas that teach a more tolerant and multi-dimensional view of Islam and politics, while providing Islamic youth with a much desired quality education.\textsuperscript{57}

Another dimension of these efforts is illustrated by the State Department’s current plans to start a publication to provide an elite discussion forum for people around the world to talk about the problems of extremism in an intellectual way. This is a direct modernization of the U.S. government-sponsored Cold War publication “Problems of Communism.”\textsuperscript{58}

Along with these efforts, the government should work with the private sector to offer a full range of productive alternatives to violent extremism. Through the attractions of American entertainment, culture, literature, music, technology, sports, education, business, politics, and religion, potential jihadist recruits can be directed away from violence and empowered to build counter-movements.\textsuperscript{59}

### 4.4.3 The Rule of Law

In American activities overseas, the rule of law can serve as a valuable tool in ensuring an appropriate balance between hard power and soft power. In Iraq, for example, one of the key challenges to establishing a successful

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\textsuperscript{54} Wilkerson, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{55} Carlson, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
legal framework was the ongoing violence in that country following the onset of the United States-led Coalition’s occupation. Military presence was essential to fulfill the occupation government’s primary obligation of ensuring the safety of the Iraqi citizenry, and to create an environment sufficiently stable to enable American and Iraqi lawmakers to reform Iraqi law.  

In addition, law can be used to control, in a flexible, responsive manner, the application of hard or soft power, in varying combinations, to address a particular threat. For example, recognizing that “where possible, kinetic [hard] operations should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur developments, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which terrorists recruit,” the Department of Defense has used Title 10 of the United States Code and other applicable authorities to establish approaches that “recognize the roles and limitations of both hard and soft power.”

Department of Defense policy documents have evolved to use traditional legal authorities in novel ways that carefully balance both hard and soft approaches. For example, relying on Title 10 as a legal foundation, a new DoD policy directive provides guidance that emphasizes the integration and balance between hard and soft power. Directive 3000.05 recognizes that there is a necessary link between military support and security and stability. The Directive “provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop.” Stability operations are defined in it to mean “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish and maintain order.”

Iraq Case Study: Once relative stability in Iraq was achieved through military force and presence, the laws developed by United States, Coalition, and Iraqi lawmakers served to promote predictability, transparency, accountability, and justice in that nation’s public institutions, thereby preserving stability.

The legal reforms crafted during the occupation of Iraq were designed to establish a peaceful, stable environment through exalting the rule of law as an immutable principle in governing the conduct of governmental and private affairs.

To ensure that these legal reforms not only encouraged and preserved stability, but were accepted by the Iraqi people, a keen cultural and historical awareness of the Iraqi people and their customs was critical. Recognizing the necessity of this awareness, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Office of General Counsel actively sought the assistance of Iraqi attorneys in drafting legal instruments and staffing them with the appropriate Iraqi Ministry and Governing Council officials.

Through a meticulous effort to coordinate legal reforms with experts in the Coalition capitals of Washington, London, and Canberra; international financial institutions; and, most importantly, with the Iraqi Governing Council, the affected ministries, and Iraqi attorneys from the public and private sectors, the CPA sought to foster a sense of ownership in the reforms by local officials. Furthermore, the CPA sought to develop legal reforms that were realistic and pragmatic, in keeping with the authorities conferred under relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and worthy of enduring after the occupation. The laws that CPA attorneys crafted in conjunction with their Iraqi and Coalition counterparts were designed to be flexible, adaptive tools that could accommodate the emerging needs of the new Iraqi government, as it grew in strength and credibility.

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60 Brigadier General Scott Castle, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
61 Gates cited by Carlson, Castle, etc.
62 Castle, op. cit.
64 Ibid.
According to the Directive, stability operations “are a core United States military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.” Notably, stability operations are given a priority comparable to combat operations.

The objective of stability operations is to help establish order that advances American interests and values. The immediate goal is to provide essential services and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to “help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.”

Other examples of how law can be used to facilitate the application of instruments of soft power even by traditional wielders of hard power, such as DoD, can be found in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. The act authorizes DoD to engage in security and stabilization assistance, permits local commanders to authorize urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects through the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, in a variety of ways, enhances DoD’s authority to engage in military-to-military contact programs and education initiatives with friendly foreign countries.

Law can also serve as a tool to provide a structure for reallocating hard and soft power assets as necessary to defeat an ever-changing and evolving threat. Many have suggested wide-sweeping reform in interagency cooperation and financing. Some commentators note an absence of optimal synergy and coordination between the traditional source of United States hard power, the Department of Defense, and other agencies more traditionally associated with soft power, such as the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury, and USAID. Law can serve as a mechanism to redress this situation.

Through new legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, enacted to better define the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and reporting relationships among DoD components, the executive government landscape can be reconfigured to encourage more robust cooperation among government agencies, and thus ensure that the “right” agency or teams of agencies are responsible for appropriately applying hard and soft power in response to a particular challenge.

In particular, the Departments of State and Defense may require legislation that sets forth their roles and responsibilities with greater clarity while at the same time retaining sufficient flexibility to successfully confront asymmetric challenges. Similarly, clarity can be given as to whom other agencies of government report when committed to international missions under the aegis of the Chief of Mission. Furthermore, remedial legislation can authorize and establish rules for the transfer of appropriations among federal agencies in order to fund urgently required activities necessary to counter particular asymmetrical threat challenges.

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65 Castle, op. cit.
67 Ibid.
68 Stone and Castle, op. cit.
69 Stone, op. cit.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
Even with a change in law that encourages increased governmental cooperation and accountability, strong National Security Council (NSC) policy guidance and leadership will be necessary to ensure effective interagency coordination and joint action in response to any given threat. The NSC staff must have the credibility to reach across agencies and draw on support from agency representatives, regardless of the impact to their budgets and parochial interests.

4.4.4 Trade and Commerce

The soft power that comes with successfully and persistently exporting the “American Brand” cannot be underestimated, as previously discussed. Military power may be necessary to promote the degree of security that is a precursor to sustained commercial progress in certain sectors, but commerce can serve as a valuable tool in its own right in promoting American ideals.72

Only with additional resources can the agencies mentioned above effectively support building an integrated and strong U.S. international commercial presence. It is paramount that greater weight be placed on exporting American goods and services while liberalizing trade regimes and creating transparent and level playing fields for healthy global competition.

Relaxing hard-power-related export restrictions that arose during the Cold War and encouraging United States trade abroad are important initiatives in improving international relations. Export regulations arose during the Cold War as an element of hard power that ensured that the Soviet Union and its allies did not obtain American leading-edge technologies or critical defense items. Today these restrictions remain and serve to discourage U.S. companies from exporting certain controlled items abroad. They increase the transactional costs and risks of doing business in emerging economies across the globe and encumber international partnerships in areas of evolving technologies. When American goods cannot be exported easily, this incentivizes other nations to develop indigenous technologies that the United States has little or no ability to monitor or control. Loosening outdated restrictions, when and where applicable, would also be seen as a gesture of diplomatic goodwill.73

4.4.5 Partnerships

4.4.5.1 Non-governmental Organizations

The U.S. government should seek to expand its influence through increased partnerships with Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and private foundations. Public health diplomacy is another one of the areas where Americans are able to build strategic partnerships with third parties, working together to offer immunizations and health screenings, among other medical and dental services.74

NGOs have played an increasingly visible role in international affairs over the past several decades. In fact, NGOs are now recognized as important international economic players, accounting for over 5 percent of GDP and over 4 percent of the employment in 36 of the most impoverished countries in the world. By providing humanitarian and development assistance in failed or failing states and other denied areas, NGOs are often able to access potential extremist areas before the government can establish any intelligence or military presence.75

72 Charles J. Skuba, USNI-CACI symposium comments.
73 Ibid.
74 Rutstein, op. cit.
75 Howard, op. cit.
Private foundations have mirrored the success of NGOs by being able to directly impact areas of need. One example presented during the symposium was the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which provides much-needed vaccinations to people across the globe, and indirectly communicates U.S. ideals through both words and deeds.76

As critical infrastructures increasingly cross international borders, the United States has been, and continues working with counterparts at local levels, and not just with national governmental entities. Such partnerships increase U.S. visibility on the ground, especially in “denied territory.” The United States must continue to foster, if not expand, professional counterpart relationships in numerous areas of common concern – e.g., law enforcement, regulatory, telecommunications, information technology, and finance – to help develop transparent, integrated, harmonized infrastructures around the world.77

It is critical that the U.S. government work together with NGOs and similar organizations as part of an overall soft power strategy.

4.4.5.2 The Private Sector

The international reach of American business significantly contributes to the effectiveness of soft power. American companies, in terms of operations, sales, and market share, are a tremendous presence in the world. American entrepreneurship adds substance to the real desirability of American values and interests.

American brands affect the daily lives of millions of people around the world. “When the world’s consumers boot up a computer, fly in an airplane, have a meal, or buy a household product or service, in general they prefer an American product.”78 America thus has great impact, by both what it sells and what it buys. Through these means, the United States affects other countries in a dominant fashion, exceeding in many spheres the rest of the world combined.

More than 800 children come out to see the first viewing-by-rickshaw of Sisimpur – Bangladesh’s Sesame Street – in the small town of Savar. After only a few months on the road, Sisimpur attracts an average of 100 children each showing. Photo courtesy of USAID.

Foreigners learn about the United States from our movies and books, and increasingly from the Internet.

- American films fill 80 percent of the movie screens in Europe.
- American authors outsell others when translated into native languages worldwide.
- American news sources, social networking sites like YouTube and Facebook, and online gaming communities provide foreigners with insight into American culture.

– Colonel Randy Larsen and Ambassador Brian Carlson

In addition, American pop culture embodied in products and communications has widespread global appeal.79 The worldwide demand for American products and media is indisputable. Global audiences and markets clamor for U.S.-made films, 24-hour news channels, and products from Apple and Nike. But while the popularity of American products and entertainment and the reputation

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76 Larsen, op. cit.
77 Winer, op. cit.
78 Skuba, op. cit.
of American culture and values have grown, they have not necessarily improved the U.S.’s image.

There are many American companies that have actively developed social outreach programs in their host nations. For example, Johnson & Johnson is heavily involved in “community-based programs that improve health and well-being.” The company has been actively involved in Africa for over 75 years and currently supports efforts in more than 20 countries. Some of Johnson & Johnson’s programs focus on HIV/AIDS, women’s health, medical education, and environmental preservation. These types of corporate initiatives build good will and encourage the acceptance of American products, services, and ideals.

The U.S. government needs to increase its support of and participation in partnerships with private sector entities like these to meet its soft power goals.

While the entrepreneurial and entertainment sides of American culture have dramatic impact around the world, there needs to be some degree of governmental direction to support, reinforce, and publicize soft power strategies through private parties.

One example of doing so has been through the concept of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

Since its creation in 2004, the U.S. government’s MCC has awarded nearly $6.7 billion in development grants to 34 of the world’s poorest countries to fight poverty through economic growth. While philanthropic, community development, and social responsibility activities in poor countries are important, a truly transformative difference is felt when U.S. companies actually do business in these countries. American businesses increasingly view MCC countries as carrying a “good government seal” that attracts investment because they perform better than their peers on independent measures of governance.

4.4.6 International Diplomacy

Although hard power will always be necessary to address certain military threats, soft power (or international diplomacy) is a critical tool in facilitating U.S. leadership and influence on the world stage.

To complement its dominance in the arena of military power, the United States must work with foreign governments and international institutions to strengthen existing partnerships or build new ones that enhance its abilities to combat and contain the forces of global extremism, violence, and other similar asymmetric threats. By partnering with other states through international agreements, the United States can work with powers across the globe to address asymmetric threats and challenges successfully in more effective ways. Such partnerships can only take place if there are “harmonized and transparent” institutions and infrastructures that allow the United States and its allies to share information and act cohesively. In particular, U.S. defense, law enforcement, and economic development agencies require the ability to interface and interact effectively on programs with their counterparts overseas if they are to be successfully integrated.

82 Carlson, op. cit.
83 Winer, op. cit.
This extends to developing and maintaining strong international commercial partnerships, which is based on a sound fiscal regime at the international level. The institutions of the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Export/Import Bank, the Trade and Development Agency, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation must be used effectively as instruments of support for both the U.S. private sector and national security interests.

Actions in Afghanistan are illustrative of the applications of these concepts and intentions. Today, 42 nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, and development organizations, as well as the United Nations, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are working collectively for the benefit of the Afghan nation. Military commanders are coordinating efforts of disparate agencies and organizations to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction requirements. However, federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Health, and Treasury, as well as USAID, remain understaffed and underfunded for pressing problems in Afghanistan, and challenges continue. It is clear that the formula for long-term security in Afghanistan lies in economic and social development, reconstruction, and improved governance – actions particularly defined by soft power. This is also a formula that can be repeatedly adapted and applied, particularly within an overall security strategy.

Further, the United States must increasingly focus on using the “hard side of soft power,” whereby “the tools of ideological engagement – words, deeds, and images” are increasingly leveraged to defeat asymmetric threats such as violent extremism. Through enhanced public diplomacy and strategic communications aimed at overseas audiences, the United States can win the war of ideas.

The State Department’s education and cultural affairs programs have been highly successful in allowing foreign citizens to learn about and grow to respect American culture. Additionally, the United States must bolster its international information programs, which convey U.S. ideas through speakers, publications, dialogue, and international broadcasting. Further, there must be a greater focus on international broadcasting in local languages.

There are also numerous ways in which the United States can use diplomatic tools to increase its efficacy overseas. For example, it can seek assistance and support from “credible Muslim voices” that can help advance “universal values of social justice and liberty.” It can also accomplish the objective of promoting its values by partnering with the private sector to use the best web-based social networking techniques that afford an alternative to extremist modes of communication.

Thus, while U.S. military strength continues to serve to some extent as a deterrent (perhaps in a different context and to different extent from that during the Cold War), U.S. diplomatic strength and influence overseas have grown increasingly more potent and effective as tools of American power.

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84 Carlson, op. cit.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
A great deal has changed since the first two symposia were held in May and October 2008. A new administration promises to modify or change the national security structure, renewed tensions in the Middle East have escalated global threats, and the worldwide financial crisis has worsened. This is in dramatic contrast to the relative stability of the threat environment that generally characterized the Cold War era.

As the Obama administration gathers momentum, it is important to ask how that impetus should be directed into a practical national security strategy that will work effectively and best serve the United States, its allies, and the world.

“To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”

– President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2009

Symposium One showed that our future appears cluttered with asymmetric threats that are not readily countered by the existing national security structure.

Symposium Two has shown that America needs to rediscover the soft power instruments that were once employed effectively, but largely abandoned after the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s. In fact, “[c]orrecting that acute imbalance in American ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power is likely to prove the single greatest challenge for the next Secretary of State [Hillary Clinton].”

On the other hand, hard power may be completely different by 2020, and the United States must be ready for anything. Further, while the concept of soft power is intuitively understood, it is empirically known to be difficult to implement. Also, compounding these challenges, the increasing importance of environmental issues, including climate change, renewable energies, and availability of food supplies, will need to be given greater consideration.

Kitfield, op. cit.

For example, the November 2008 report by the Project on National Security Reform, entitled “Forging a New Shield,” proposed “a fully integrated program of reform and renewal” for the U.S.’s national security system and apparatus.

Dr. Linton Wells II, USNI-CACI symposium comments.

Ganyard, op. cit.
The conclusions of Symposium Two are that the United States must develop a truly integrated national security strategy that synchronizes both hard and soft power appropriate for the specifics of each situation, and that adjusts as the particular threat evolves. This mix is now commonly referred to as “smart power.”

Smart power is an accurate description, since smart power must be based upon an understanding that the dynamic, unpredictable character of today’s security challenges demands a strategy with commensurate flexibility. While the nation’s ability to respond militarily will always remain relevant, even dominant, the United States must aggressively and creatively pursue opportunities to use soft power through avenues that include law, trade, diplomacy, humanitarian operations, and strategic communications. Only by creating a comprehensive capacity to build and adapt diverse combinations of hard and soft power flexibly and rapidly will America successfully wield the smart power necessary to safeguard national security interests.

American leaders have begun to respond. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared at her confirmation hearing that, “We must use what has been called ‘smart power,’ the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.”

The challenge of integrating hard and soft power, finding the right mix of the two, and aligning resources and structures to achieve smart power will therefore be the central elements of the final symposium in this series.

### Appendix A: Summary of Symposium One

Symposium One, held May 8, 2008 at Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., focused on global diplomacy, strategic communications, securing the homeland, and a global strategy to counterterrorism as integral components of the challenges that the United States faces, which require “whole government” solutions.

A clear consensus emerged from Symposium One that there are significant opportunities to develop an integrated national asymmetric threat strategy to address changing global threats. While there are tactical approaches for all U.S. government organizations, they are seldom strategic, and even less likely to be integrated. We are “thinking too small … and we must think BIG.” To capitalize on the opportunities before it, the U.S. government must:

- **Develop a new National Security Act** (similar to the National Security Act of 1947) that restructures U.S. government for the twenty-first century. This would flatten organizations, eliminate stovepipes, develop joint organizations (like Goldwater-Nichols) to counter the large threats, and create an effective and agile government by giving enhanced responsibility and authority to the lowest (appropriate) management level possible.

- **Establish one U.S. government strategic process** that would produce an integrated national asymmetric threat strategy to address changing global economic, political, and social dependencies and inter-dependencies. This plan should incorporate methods and means to address sub-regional, regional, continental, and global instabilities and embrace globalization in a high-technology environment.

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94 Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nominee for Secretary of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing, January 13, 2009.
95 The full report of the proceedings can be found at http://www.caci.com/announcement/CACI_Asymmetric_Threat_paper.pdf.
96 Anthony C. Zinni, NDU-CACI symposium comments.
97 Ibid.
- **Speak with “one voice” and effectively communicate** a description of the asymmetric threats and the objectives of the integrated national asymmetric threat strategy to the American public. Achieving this objective requires renewed efforts and dialogue to inform all citizens of the varying international norms of morality and how they compare and contrast with the characteristics that define America’s national identity and culture. A new civics curriculum should be established for America’s schools, instructing on America’s heritage, the rights and responsibilities of American citizens, the structure and role of the government as it has developed, and the study of America’s foundational documents.

### Four Pillars of a Unified Asymmetric Threat Strategy

**A Strategic Communications Strategy**

America’s strategic communications programs are a significant national weakness. The U.S. government must revitalize, reinstitute, and aggressively implement an enhanced, worldwide strategic communications program addressing both near- and long-term needs. Of particular note, Islamist extremists have clearly understood and exploited the value of strategic communications in propagating their ideology and intimidating their adversaries. The U.S. and others have not yet found effective means to cope with or counter this threat. To do so requires a Strategic Communications Plan that:

- **Leverages communications both defensively and offensively** by telling America’s story internally and externally;
- **Effectively counters propaganda** such as misinformation, distortions, prejudices, and untruths;
- **Promotes the United States as the inspirational world leader** in advancing freedom, the rights of the individual, and forms of government that embrace equality and the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;
- **Leverages current and future communication technologies** to convey these messages on a consistent, frequent and worldwide basis; and
- **Responds to global, national, state, and local needs and goals** because “one tactical action or missed-action can destroy the entire communication plan.”

**A Defense and Homeland Security Strategy**

Asymmetric threats are not solely military and require the integrated engagement of all elements of international and national power to be effective. It is, therefore, imperative for national homeland security planners, military strategists, doctrinal experts, policy analysts, and scholars to coalesce around a set of common terms, strategies, and operational methods to successfully combat these threats. A defense and homeland security strategy must:

- **Respond to adversaries with a common voice and approach.** The U.S. government seems to have missed recent opportunities to engage the Iranian government, on such issues as the development of weapons of mass destruction. A response from the U.S. President or senior representative might have spoken directly to the Iranian people and candidly set out both American expectations of the Iranian government and what America could offer in return.
- **Create a credible and widely accepted counter-narrative to enemies,** which must come from within the Muslim community, e.g., through clerics and

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98 Montgomery Meigs, NDU-CACI symposium comments.
99 Steven Monblatt, NDU-CACI symposium comments.
women’s movements. The counter-narrative must be consistent with Muslim culture and traditions to be effective.  

- **Help governments of failed or failing states to rebuild.** The United States and other groups must increasingly focus on helping failing states establish governments that can provide effective political, economic, social, and security institutions that are grounded in internationally accepted rules of law.  

  Also, when engaged in military conflicts, stabilization operations need to be planned and conducted simultaneously with any concurrent combat operations.

### An Economic Strategy

A sound economic strategy contributes to national security. The next administration will have to address the *de facto* economic crisis, while planning to meet long-term economic goals. This will include identifying what should have the highest priority in government spending – defense, homeland security, health, education, intelligence, diplomacy, and aid for natural disasters, for example. To address these questions, the United States should:

- **Establish a national economic strategy** to lead to long-term economic stability and growth, and world economic leadership. The nation also needs to ensure sufficient resources to permit the government to fight world terror and help build a stable world.

- **Develop a long-range budget** to create appropriate economic and financial programs for national security. It was suggested that the United States should develop a ten-year budget, instead of a one-year budget, to help drive economic strategy into the future. A comprehensive national economic strategy that considers the economic impact of asymmetric threats would be more successful if it encompassed a period more on the scale of these long-term problems.

- **Redirect American agricultural know-how to the production of food supplies throughout the world** to help ensure adequate levels of food and nutrition for people at home and abroad. Food shortages are an increasing concern, particularly in developing countries where population growth is outpacing economic growth and agricultural output.

- **Develop a comprehensive strategy for energy independence.** While a degree of energy interdependence is given, perhaps even desirable, the increasing American dependence on foreign energy resources is threatening America’s economic and national security interests. The nation’s strategy must be one of increasing available clean energy resources through research and development, innovation, conservation, and efficient wind, solar, and biofuels development. Such a strategy may be the single most important thing the United States can do to redress strategic, environmental, and economic problems.

  A new economic security strategy will require trade-offs and changes in priorities. Therefore, governmental policies must evaluate carefully the issues of free and open market competition, protection and promotion of domestic commercial interests, and enhancement of global market economies that will aid emerging national economies.

### A Diplomatic Strategy

National, regional, cultural and religious influences require a different global and regional diplomatic model. Various governmental agencies “carve” the world differently and one department or agency’s regions do not necessarily overlap with those of another. This degrades the quality of coordination, integration, and synchronization of missions and programs. Consequently, there needs be a national alignment of regional responsibilities among U.S. governmental departments/agencies to fully develop a new and relevant diplomatic strategy.

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100 Monblatt, op. cit.
101 James Pavitt, NDU-CACI symposium comments.
102 Monblatt, op. cit.
Participants in Symposium One felt that several potential courses of action were worthy of further discussion:

- **Reorganize the U.S. government into joint regional organizations.** Achieving economies of scale, these joint regional organizations could be led by the State Department, but would include leaders and subject matter experts from other government organizations as well as universities, NGOs, and other international organizations that together could support the region more effectively than the government’s current organizations.

- **Organize U.S. ambassadors by region and topic** to implement diplomatic strategy at the regional, local, and thematic levels. The traditional model for diplomatic activities establishes the preeminence of the U.S. ambassador to a country – each has a direct line of authority to the President rather than the Secretary of State. The State Department is already attempting to organize the ambassadors regionally and topically with a Deputy Assistant Secretary currently established for oil and one for Southern Europe. It is now the case that regular meetings in the region are held to coordinate policies and activities.

These efforts seem to be a good start, but may be “too small” a series of actions to even cumulatively build the flexible, responsive organization for the uncertain conditions and asymmetric threats of the twenty-first century.

### Additional Strategic Considerations

Other features of an integrated national asymmetric threat response strategy would include developing regional and global:

- Health policy and programs;
- Education policy and programs;
- Emergency response policy and programs;
- Economic policy and programs;
- Resource-sharing policy and programs; and
- Nation-building policy and programs.

The preceding list is representative of the type of programs and empowered leadership that the United States will need in the twenty-first century and beyond. Culture, religion, and ideals are very different across the vast spectrum of nations that the United States may hope to assist – but the goal remains the same: Build stable nation-states that will provide political, economic, social, and security institutions and that will have the moral, intellectual, and physical resources to ensure that their citizens have job security, food, clean water, freedom of religion, education, and hope for the future.103

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103 In effect, these recommended actions update and build upon President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” as articulated in a speech to the Congress on January 6, 1941: “the freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and the freedom from fear.”
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